Bringing macroeconomics back into the political economy of reform: The Lisbon Agenda and the 'fiscal philosophy' of EMU by Mabbett, Deborah & Schelkle, W.
 
 
Birkbeck ePrints: an open access repository of the 
research output of Birkbeck College 
 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk 
 
 
Mabbett, Deborah; Schelkle, Waltraud (2007). 
Bringing macroeconomics back in to the political 
economy of reform: The Lisbon Agenda and the 
'fiscal philosophy' of EMU. JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 45 (1). pp. 81-103.  
 
This is an author-produced version of a paper published in JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies (ISSN 0021-9886). This version has been peer-
reviewed but does not include the final publisher proof corrections, published 
layout or pagination.  
 
All articles available through Birkbeck ePrints are protected by intellectual 
property law, including copyright law. Any use made of the contents should 
comply with the relevant law. 
 
 
Citation for this version: 
Mabbett, Deborah; Schelkle, Waltraud (2007). Bringing macroeconomics back 
in to the political economy of reform: The Lisbon Agenda and the 'fiscal 
philosophy' of EMU. London: Birkbeck ePrints. Available at: 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/archive/00000259 
 
 
Citation for the publisher’s version: 
Mabbett, Deborah; Schelkle, Waltraud (2007). Bringing macroeconomics back 
in to the political economy of reform: The Lisbon Agenda and the 'fiscal 
philosophy' of EMU. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (1). 
pp. 81-103. 
 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk 
Contact Birkbeck ePrints at lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk 
 
Bringing macroeconomics back into the political economy of reform: 
the Lisbon Agenda and the ‘fiscal philosophy’ of EMU 
Deborah Mabbett (Birkbeck, University of London) and Waltraud Schelkle (European 
Institute, LSE)* 
Abstract 
The Lisbon Strategy supports reform of member states’ tax-benefit systems while the 
‘fiscal philosophy’ of the EMU postulates that governments should allow only automatic 
stabilisers, built into tax-benefit systems, to smooth aggregate income. We ask whether 
these two pillars of EU economic governance are compatible. By exploring how 
structural reforms affect fiscal stabilisation, we complement a political economy 
literature that asks whether fiscal consolidation fosters or hinders structural reforms. 
Using EUROMOD, a tax-benefit model for the EU-15, we identify the connections 
between specific tax and benefit reforms and the size of the stabilisers. We conclude that 
Lisbon-type reforms may worsen the stabilising capacity of tax-benefit systems.  
Introduction 
This paper asks to what extent two central pillars of economic governance in the EU are 
compatible. The European agenda for growth and jobs encompasses both the Maastricht 
pillar for macroeconomic stability, and the Lisbon pillar for microeconomic or structural 
adjustment. The Maastricht pillar is promoted by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) while the Lisbon pillar is developed 
through the European Employment Strategy (EES). We begin by viewing the issue of 
compatibility in political economy terms, and then explore the economic aspect further, 
focusing on the ‘automatic stabilisers’.  Automatic stabilisers are revenue and 
expenditure items of the budget that vary counter-cyclically with the income or spending 
of households and thus add to their disposable income in recessions and reduce it in 
booms. They are ‘automatic’ in the sense that governments do not need to enact their 
operation through policy adjustments since they vary with GDP by design.  
 
The fiscal philosophy of the SGP and BEPG endorses ‘rule-based’ as opposed to 
discretionary macroeconomic stabilisation.1 Governments should rely on the automatic 
stabilisers to do the smoothing of aggregate income. However, the endorsement of 
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1 See, for instance, Barrell and Pina (2000, p.1) and Buti et al (2003, p.28) on the underlying philosophy of 
the Pact.  
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automatic stabilisation is half-hearted, as the prevailing tenor of the EU’s reform agenda 
is that structural reform will also take care of macroeconomic stabilisation. The structural 
reform agenda emphasises the desirability of increasing the flexibility of the labour 
market and improving incentives for job creation through lower tax rates (CEC, 2005a, 
p.6). These reforms are seen as ‘improv[ing] the overall adaptability and adjustment 
capacity of economies in response to changes in cyclical economic conditions’ ((CEC, 
2005c, p.15; our emphasis). In other words, appropriate microeconomic policies will 
obviate the need for macroeconomic stabilisation. In fact, a weakening of automatic 
stabilisers may be a blessing in disguise as less stabilisation would improve the private 
sector’s own capacity to adjust and self-insure (Buti et al, 2002; Buti and van den Noord, 
2003). We address this argument both theoretically and empirically. 
 
Our paper proceeds as follows: First, we outline in section I how our study relates to 
wider debates in the political economy literature. Section II describes the conceptual 
framework. Our empirical analysis in section III tries to establish, first, whether there is 
any evidence for reforms taking place to an extent that could affect the macroeconomy; 
secondly, how reforms would affect automatic stabilisers based on simulations in 
EUROMOD, a tax-benefit model of the EU-15 countries; and, thirdly, whether our 
results suggest a tradeoff between stabilisation and adjustment.  The conclusions outline 
some policy implications. 
 
I. The conflicting political economy of the EU’s simultaneous agenda 
 
The relevant political economy literature on the links between structural reforms and 
fiscal policy can be divided in two strands. The first starts from the diagnosis of pervasive 
credibility problems in policymaking and argues in favour of fiscal consolidation being 
done simultaneously with structural reform, as is currently promoted by the SGP/BEPG 
and the Lisbon Agenda. The second strand, based on the comparative study of major 
reform processes, calls for sequential timing of reforms and budget consolidation, 
suggesting that fiscal austerity might otherwise impede structural reform. Our analysis 
fits into the second strand, to which we add the idea that structural reform under 
conditions of permanent fiscal austerity may jeopardize the stabilising qualities of fiscal 
systems, despite a potential to enhance them.  
 
The ‘back against the wall’ rationale for the EU’s simultaneous agenda  
 
The first strand maintains that the simultaneous agenda of the EU promises a double 
dividend of fiscal prudence and reform activism (Bean, 1998; Padoan and Rodrigues, 
2004). More specifically, the hardening of governments’ budget constraints will provide 
a political environment which facilitates labour market reforms.  Because public 
expenditures are constrained by a fiscal rule such as the Stability Pact, the labour market 
parties (unions in particular) eventually realise that increases in wages and other costs 
have an immediate impact on employment. This ‘back against the wall’ hypothesis 
maintains that fiscal crises make reform easier because they raise awareness of the costs 
of the status quo and thus weaken the opposition to reform (Rodrik, 1996, pp.26-29; IMF, 
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2004a, pp.113-115). In more formal terms, an unconstrained government is assumed to 
choose time-inconsistent, inflationary policies. Once prevented from doing so by 
monetary and fiscal rules, its incentives change in favour of promoting labour market 
reform to lower the equilibrium unemployment rate. 
 
The most explicit argument along these lines can be found in Calmfors (2001, pp.268-
270). In his model, the government weighs up inflation, unemployment and labour 
market reforms, all of which are disliked by the majority in the electorate, who are also 
the dominant group in the labour market. Reforms can reduce equilibrium 
unemployment, but they are undertaken only if the benefits in lower expected inflation 
and unemployment outweigh the costs in terms of lower real wages or less employment 
security enjoyed by those in employment. In this model, the loss of access to 
countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies increases the incentive to reform. The model 
assumes that labour market flexibility can dampen cycles induced by both supply and 
inflation shocks, a view we question below. It is also assumed that more reform and less 
countercyclical demand-management is socially desirable, because such a move would 
raise the welfare of labour market outsiders, who are the political minority.  
 
In ‘back against the wall’ models, all policymaking is seen as distortionary, unless it 
consists of attempts to correct structural market imperfections that can reduce the long-
term equilibrium rate of unemployment. Given their preferences, governments need to be 
whipped into such enlightened reform policies. Externally enforced fiscal consolidation 
may provide for such a whip and thus yields a double dividend of increased structural 
flexibility and fiscal prudence.  
 
The ‘need for bribes’ rationale for sequencing the EU’s dual agenda  
 
The second strand of the political economy literature sees tensions between an ambitious 
agenda of structural reform and fiscal consolidation. It is based on what might be called a 
‘need for bribes’ hypothesis, suggesting that fiscal space is required so as to allow 
compensation of potential or actual losers from reforms. Testing for these alternative 
hypotheses, the IMF sides with the ‘need for bribes’ hypothesis and recommends 
accepting a temporary worsening of public finances to make reforms happen (IMF 2004a, 
pp.115-116, 132; IMF 2004b, pp.48, 58). A rise in the budget deficit at the beginning of 
the reform process may be necessary not only to buy off opposition but also in order to 
bear the upfront costs of reforms, such as establishing more effective employment 
agencies in preparation for welfare-to-work measures.  
 
This strand of the literature is interested in what determines reform dynamics,2 stimulated 
by the wealth of experience with major reform processes in countries at all levels of 
political and economic development (Rodrik, 1996). Partly for reasons of econometric 
methodology, policymaking is conceptualised as the outcome of a government optimising 
an objective function that is representative of an electoral platform or of the median 
voter’s preferences. By contrast with Calmfors’s model, there is no ‘persecuted 
                                                 
2 Other papers following this line of argument are Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), Pierson (2001), Grüner  
(2002) and Wyplosz in IMF (2004a, pp.130-131).  
 4
minority’; if it faced no obstacles, the government would steadily implement the 
measures that make the political economy move on the reform path towards the desired 
state of labour, product and financial markets or the tax system.3 But the government is 
constrained by entrenched special interests as well as facing uncertainty arising from 
economic factors that are not directly under its control (IMF, 2004a, p.109). These 
constraints determine whether structural reforms get sufficient political support to be 
carried out.  
 
One important argument in favour of the ‘need for bribes’ is that structural reforms under 
conditions of ‘permanent austerity’ (Pierson 2001) are biased towards measures which 
are fiscally favourable and shift costs to firms. In particular, stricter employment 
protection may be conceded in exchange for lower non-employment benefits. Such 
perverse reforms are a product of reform activism under fiscal constraints. The Lisbon 
Agenda may thus get a double whammy from simultaneous fiscal consolidation and 
welfare reform: not only does austerity weaken the political support for reforms but it 
also gives interest groups reasons to seek forms of compensation that obstruct specific 
Lisbon goals. The general implication of this argument is that tax and benefit policies can 
support the efficient operation of markets, as groups will otherwise promote their 
interests through channels which distort markets.  It therefore rests on a political 
economy in which governments may conduct enlightened policies to counteract market 
failures. 
 
In practice, the extent to which the Maastricht criteria have generated a double whammy 
is questionable, partly because governments have not always complied with the fiscal 
rules. Fatàs et al (2003) find that, in the run-up to EMU, some governments engaged in 
procyclical contractions to meet the Maastricht criteria but, with the exception of Italy 
and Portugal, fiscal stances after 1998 have not been procyclical. Buti et al (2002) and 
Buti and van den Noord (2003) argue that governments have been able to pursue fiscal 
consolidation through welfare reforms without procyclical effects. With the partial 
exception of these latter studies, there has been little analysis of how structural reforms 
may affect macroeconomic conditions, nor their impact on fiscal instruments for 
stabilisation.4   
 
To sum up: The literature implies two stark hypotheses on the simultaneous agenda of the 
EU. The ‘back against the wall’ approach argues that combining fiscal consolidation with 
structural reforms yields a double dividend, providing both for healthier public finances 
and signalling to entrenched interests that the status quo has become too expensive and 
must be changed. The ‘need for bribes’ hypothesis implies that the dual agenda of the EU 
                                                 
3 Econometrically, this means that a dynamic equation links the annual changes in structural reform 
indicators to their past levels (ie. taking account of initial conditions and path dependency), to a set of 
explanatory variables that presumably constrain a policymaker’s reform decision (the economic and 
political constraints identified by the literature on the political economy of reform) and to a stochastic term 
that captures uncertainty (IMF, 2004a, Appendix 3.2). 
4 CEC (2005b, pp.33-37) reviews the literature on the ‘macroeconomic impact of some packages of Lisbon 
reforms’, yet all that this survey provides are various estimates of the aggregate gains in GDP growth to be 
expected from microeconomic reforms in product and labour markets or investment in the ‘knowledge 
economy’. 
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will obstruct reforms because simultaneous fiscal consolidation and reform is likely to 
weaken political support and create counterproductive incentives for governments.  
 
Bringing macroeconomics back into the political economy of reform 
 
In this section, we extend the ‘need for bribes’ approach to argue for the importance of 
automatic stabilisers. Our argument is that policies to counteract special interests and 
combat market failure operate best when they are institutionally embedded, as 
governments’ discretionary interventions have a tendency to be procyclical.5 
Procyclicality can arise from political opportunism by governments constrained only by a 
deficit limit, or by efforts to conduct a discretionary countercyclical policy which are 
liable to be foiled by decision and implementation lags. These problems point to the 
value of automatic stabilisation mechanisms generated by spending and revenue-raising 
processes which are deeply institutionalised. 
 
If we think of structural reforms as involving changes to long-standing benefit 
commitments and tax assessment practices, we can see that there are at least three 
channels through which reforms might affect macroeconomic conditions and the conduct 
of policy. First, structural reforms could affect households’ expectations of their 
permanent income. Contributory insurance systems in particular make commitments 
which households may rely on in formulating their expectations. Reforms to these 
systems amount to a publicly endorsed breaking of commitments.6 They have the 
potential to affect households’ confidence in collective insurance and thus their spending 
decisions.7  Second, if employment protection is reduced and job-changing becomes 
more frequent, household incomes could become more volatile. The potential impact on 
household income expectations and consumption is uncertain: if increased labour market 
flexibility leads to lower long-term unemployment, income fluctuations might be of 
shorter duration if higher frequency. Third, reforms which lower tax rates or reduce 
benefits for low-income and unemployed households will reduce the size of the automatic 
stabilisers, implying that less smoothing of disposable income relative to market income 
will take place, which could also affect consumption, particularly among households 
which are constrained to base their consumption on their current income. The focus of 
this paper is on this third channel but we also touch briefly on the second channel. 
 
Our conceptualisation of the sources of macroeconomic instability is Keynesian in that 
we assume that product markets are monopolistically competitive, ie. firms have some 
price-setting power and engage in product differentiation (‘brands’). In such markets, 
firms are demand constrained. Moreover, fluctuations in nominal demand are not 
immediately countered by compensating price adjustments; instead, costly processes of 
wage and price inflation or deflation are set in motion by fluctuations in demand in the 
                                                 
5 Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) find that automatic countercyclical tax and spending changes were offset 
by increased spending during economic upturns. 
6 We are grateful to Elena Bechberger (LSE) for alerting us to this paradox. Her thesis will explore welfare 
state reforms from this angle in France and Germany. 
7 Compare the recent comments of the governor of the Bank of Finland that the weakness of the Eurozone 
is baffling: “Perhaps reforms first increase uncertainty.” (Financial Times, 2005) 
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absence of countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies. If households are far-sighted, 
confident about the stability of their permanent income, and able to smooth their 
consumption path with the aid of savings and credit, their reactions will tend to be 
stabilising and countercyclical demand management policies will be less important. Our 
argument that the automatic stabilisers are important therefore assumes that these 
conditions do not hold; in particular, that a significant proportion of households is credit 
constrained to some extent and thus varies consumption with fluctuations in current 
income (Andrés et al, 2004). More generally, failures in markets for insurance as well as 
credit lead to fluctuations in consumption (Flemming, 1973). By making countercyclical 
payments to households and levying procyclical taxes, governments stabilise household 
disposable incomes in ways which private financial markets do not. 
 
A key implication of this ‘market failure’ case for stabilisation is that the promotion of 
increased wage and price flexibility, as envisaged by the Lisbon agenda, does not make 
macroeconomic problems go away. Our line of reasoning can be contrasted with that of 
Buti and van den Noord (2003) which prioritizes microeconomic flexibility.8 They argue 
that automatic stabilisers will make households less flexible in adjusting to supply 
shocks. Buti and van den Noord’s argument relates to an intuition which has coloured 
understandings of the effects of the Lisbon process, which is that an economy with 
improved microeconomic flexibility will experience less persistent macroeconomic 
shocks, so that micro adjustment can be a substitute for macroeconomic stabilisation 
(CEC, 2005c). This intuition attributes macroeconomic problems to wage and price 
rigidity. Our argument is that macroeconomic stabilisation is needed to counteract market 
failures which are not due to wage or price rigidity but to the uncertainty of household 
income and limitations of financial markets. Complete credit and insurance markets 
would enable all households to maintain stable consumption in the face of income 
fluctuations. The incompleteness of these markets gives automatic stabilisers their 
importance.  
 
In pointing to the existence of market failure, we depart from ‘back against the wall’ 
models which see government intervention as the source of macroeconomic instability. 
At the same time, we extend the ‘need for bribes’ theory by acknowledging the problem 
of  procyclical discretion in fiscal policy. Stability in the structure of tax and benefit 
commitments generates automatic stabilisers which do not sacrifice the potential role of 
governments in counteracting market failures and limiting perverse impacts from interest 
group activism.  
 
II. How structural reforms affect automatic stabilisers 
 
Defining automatic stabilisers 
As the discussion above has suggested, we are focusing on automatic stabilisation within the 
context of a Keynesian analysis of the macroeconomy, and this affects the way we define 
and measure the stabilisers. A number of studies have shown that larger public sectors 
                                                 
8 See Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) for a more benign view of demand stabilisation and labour supply 
flexiblity. 
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reduce economic volatility (Rodrik 1998; Fatás and Mihov 1999; Agell 2002; Andrés et al 
2004). These authors give an eclectic account of the ways in which the public sector may 
stabilise the economy. Rodrik (1998, pp.1019-21) offers a view in which the government (as 
a whole) is conceived of as a ‘safe’ sector generating relatively stable income flows for 
households (eg. through employment) as well as through transfers. However, he also tests 
the idea pursued here, that in high-income, developed countries the government plays its 
risk-mitigating role primarily through the provision of social security rather than through 
consumption and employment, and finds it strongly supported by the statistical evidence. 
 
Our Keynesian analysis of income insurance focuses on the ways that taxes and benefits 
reduce the volatility of households’ disposable income relative to their market income. The 
reduction in volatility is designated by σ, the coefficient of cyclical stabilisation (see Box 1 
below for a formal derivation). It is possible to derive estimates of σ directly from time 
series data, as has been done by Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Bayoumi and Masson 
(1995). These analyses have yielded ‘ballpark’ figures for σ in the USA of 30-40%; in other 
words, the volatility of disposable income is 60-70% of the volatility of gross income. 
However, these studies do not attempt to distinguish between automatic stabilisers and the 
effects of discretionary adjustments to fiscal policy; nor do they provide a framework for 
linking specific policy parameters to the magnitude of fiscal stabilisation. These limitations 
can be overcome by using a tax-benefit simulation model to calculate σ, and we do this 
below, using EUROMOD. The method resembles that used in a study by Auerbach and 
Feenberg (2000) to arrive at estimates of σ for the USA of 25-30%. 
 
The measures for automatic stabilisation reported here are explicitly based on the impact of 
taxes and benefits on the household sector. This approach to the stabilisers contrasts with 
that taken by the European Commission (2002) and the OECD (Van den Noord 2000), 
where automatic stabilisation is conceived in terms of the cyclical sensitivity of the 
government budget. There are several important differences between the factors which 
drive changes in the budget balance to GDP ratio (BB/GDP) and those that stabilise 
household disposable income (Mélitz 2005). Most notably, the BB/GDP ratio is affected 
by corporate tax receipts, whereas in our framework, variations in corporate taxes are 
unlikely to have a significant stabilising effect on demand because firms are not generally 
credit-constrained: their expenditure depends on expected profits rather than current (net) 
income (Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000, p.18 make a similar point).9 
 
What determines the size of automatic stabilisers? 
The impact of an automatic stabiliser such as the personal income tax or unemployment 
benefits is the result of two components:  
 
Responsiveness: A stabiliser must vary with the business cycle so as to trigger a counter-
cyclical response. This responsiveness or cyclical sensitivity is measured by the elasticity 
of the particular budget item with respect to income. For instance, a proportional income 
tax has an elasticity of 1: a 1% change in taxable household income produces a 1% 
                                                 
9However, it could be argued that the fiscal nexus between the government and the corporate sector may 
contribute to stabilisation if the corporate tax take is highly cyclically responsive and allows the corporate 
sector to act as a provider of temporary income insurance by hoarding labour. 
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change in tax revenue. The more progressive the tax structure, the higher the elasticity 
and the larger the countercyclical responsiveness of automatic stabilisers (Auerbach and 
Feenberg, 2000, pp.14-17; van den Noord, 2000, pp.7, 16). The withdrawal of benefits as 
income increases also raises responsiveness; thus high effective marginal tax rates are 
good for stabilisation although they may be bad for work incentives. 
 
Weight: The effect of a budget item on the volatility of household income increases with 
its share of income. The share of taxes or transfers varies widely across different 
household income groups; this may be significant in determining their role in stabilising 
consumption. Smoothing the income of individuals with a high propensity to spend or 
households that are credit constrained will make stabilisation more effective as more of 
the income smoothing translates into consumption smoothing. Moreover, low incomes 
also tend to be more volatile, so there is more to stabilise to begin with (Auerbach and 
Feenberg, 2000, p.12). Thus, transfers and tax credits that directly target low income 
earners will have a stronger stabilising effect.10  
 
Which elements of the EES are likely to have an impact? 
As mentioned in the introduction, we focus on the European Employment Strategy (EES) 
as the core element of the Lisbon Strategy. Three elements of the Strategy are particularly 
relevant here. The first imperative is to make fiscal revenue systems more ‘employment 
friendly’. Measures entail (a) reducing taxes and social insurance contributions for 
workers or companies; and (b) lowering effective marginal tax rates, particularly for low-
income or secondary earners.  A second theme is the declared intention to make benefit 
systems more ‘activating’ for the inactive, the precariously employed and the 
unemployed. Measures include lower replacement rates, shorter benefit durations and the 
conditioning of benefits on participation in work or training programmes; they also entail 
increases in the minimum wage or the introduction of targeted tax credits. Finally, the 
Strategy advocates making employment contracts more flexible. The measures that 
governments envisage under this heading are not of immediate consequence to public 
finances but are supposed to reduce employment protection and to facilitate part-time 
work, in particular for women.  
 
What impact are these reforms likely to have on the responsiveness and weight of 
automatic stabilisers?  
• Lowering average and marginal effective tax rates (including social insurance 
contributions) can be expected to have a negative impact on the effectiveness of 
disposable income smoothing. Lower tax takes reduce the weight of the stabilisers, 
while lower marginal tax rates reduce responsiveness. There is an offsetting effect on 
the responsiveness of automatic stabilisers if governments simultaneously introduce 
tax credits for low-income earners, as some have done, making automatic stabilisers 
more responsive to fluctuations in these low incomes. However, it is unlikely that this 
is noticeable in the aggregate, given their negligible weight. 
• Reforms of the benefit system that try to shift a share of welfare transfers to in-work 
benefits have an ambiguous effect. Transfers may become cyclically more sensitive 
                                                 
10 However, Auerbach and Feenberg (2000, pp.13-14) estimate that a large share of automatic stabilisation 
benefits richer households where the multiplier effect is minimal. 
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since permanent transfers such as early retirement, disability or assistance to long-
term unemployed become temporary, potentially responding more to the business 
cycle. However, benefit cuts reduce the weight of this automatic stabiliser. In sum, 
the net effect of reforms on the benefit side will largely depend on whether 
responsiveness or weight is the dominant determinant of the size of automatic 
stabilisers. 
 
As noted, reforms to employment protection legislation do not affect public finances 
directly. Their indirect effects on the need for stabilisation are complex. There may be 
higher turnover in the labour market, exposing households to more risk. At the same 
time, households’ ability to manage risk may increase if their income sources are more 
diversified, due to higher participation rates and a wider range of labour market 
opportunities.  
 
III. Empirical analysis: The potential impact of Lisbon reforms on 
stabilisation 
 
In this section, we try to provide evidence for what may appear as a pure thought 
experiment: what would happen to stabilisation if Lisbon-type reforms, in particular the 
EES, were implemented? We ask, first, whether there is any evidence of these reforms 
happening and whether any pattern relevant to our study emerges. Then we use 
EUROMOD to examine the stabilising capacity of tax-benefit systems in 14 EU states. 
Finally, we look at empirical evidence for the hypothesis that weaker automatic 
stabilisers may be a blessing in disguise by improving the microeconomic adjustment 
capacity of member states. 
 
Is there evidence of Lisbon-type reforms that might affect stabilisation? 
Member states report on their reform programmes in their National Action Plans (NAPs) 
on Employment. Although the mid-term review of the European Commission claims that 
the reform record has been poor (CEC, 2005a), our own analysis of the NAPs suggests 
that states are undertaking reform measures, albeit often small and incremental in their 
impact.11 This is confirmed by the evidence available from the social reforms database of 
the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti (FRD), summarised in Table 1. This database 
documents reforms in employment protection legislation and non-employment benefits in 
the EU-14 countries from 1987 to 2002.12  Dividing the data into two periods, 1987-1994 
and 1995-2002, gives us some indication of whether there has been an increase in reform 
activism in the period covered by the Lisbon process, although the dates used are dictated 
by the availability of the data.  
 
                                                 
11 In a more extended version of this article (available at URL: http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-
3D0AB75D-BE407DA6/hbs/hs.xsl/33_45901.html), we have documented in an appendix the reforms 
affecting automatic stabilisers that member states reported. 
12 We leave out pension reforms.-- Other documentation can be found in Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti 
(2001) for reforms until 1998, in Carone and Salomäki (2001) for the second half of the 1990s and in IMF 
(2004a) but only in a highly aggregated form. 
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Table 1 synthesizes the FRD information in an admittedly crude way. The direction of 
reforms is indicated by positive and negative values, ie. they are assigned a plus if the 
database classifies them as ‘increasing flexibility’ (making systems less protective or 
generous), and, vice versa, a minus if reforms are classified as ‘decreasing flexibility’ 
(making them more protective or generous). The data in columns 1-4 summarise the 
overall impact of reforms, taking into account the intensity of each reform, measured by 
assigning a value of ±1 to ‘marginal’ and ±2 to ‘structural’ reforms. Columns 5 and 6, 
and the final row, indicate the number of reform measures adopted.  
 
Table 1: Welfare state reform directiona and intensityb, 1986-1994 and 1995-2002  
 Employment 
protection 
legislation  
Non-employment/ 
unemployment 
benefits 
Number of reformsc that decrease 
(-) or increase (+) flexibility of 
systems 
 1987-
1994 
1995-
2002 
1987-
1994 
1995-
2002 
1987-1994 1995-2002 
Austria -1 +3 0d +8 2 (-);   1 (+) 4 (-);  11 (+) 
Belgium +1 +2 +4 +5 1 (-);   5 (+) 3 (-);   9 (+) 
Denmark 0d +1 +4 +9 2 (-);   4 (+) 2 (-);   8 (+) 
Finland +2 +3 +2 +13 0 (-);   2 (+) 2 (-);  14 (+) 
France  -5 -6 +2 -6 4 (-);   2 (+) 16 (-);  9 (+) 
Germany -1 +3 -1 +14 3 (-);   2 (+) 4 (-);  18 (+) 
Greece +2 +4 -2 +5 1 (-);   2 (+) 1 (-);   7 (+) 
Ireland -1 -5 +6 +8 2 (-);   5 (+) 6 (-);   8 (+) 
Italy +1 +8 0d +5 4 (-);   4 (+) 1 (-);   12 (+) 
Netherlands +1 +5 +1 +19 4 (-);   5 (+) 2 (-);  20 (+) 
Portugal +2 -2 -2 -1 4 (-);   3 (+) 12 (-);   9 (+) 
Spain +1 -2 +4 +2 1 (-);   4 (+) 7 (-);  6 (+) 
Sweden +1 +3 +3 +12 1 (-);   4 (+) 1 (-);  11 (+) 
United Kingdom 0d -6 +5 +11 1 (-);   4 (+) 9 (-);   9 (+) 
Number of 
reformsc  
15 (-);  
16 (+) 
39 (-); 
41 (+) 
15 (-); 
31 (+) 
31 (-); 
110 (+) 
30 (-);  
47 (+) 
70 (-);  
151 (+) 
 
a - for reducing, + for increasing the flexibility of the system or rewards from the labour market, 
according to the Fondazione RDB database. 
b ±1 for ‘marginal’ reforms, ±2 for ‘structural’ reform measures; one reform package can contain 
several (marginal) measures thus valued. Packages of multiple reforms were scored as having an 
intensity value of 2 if they contained two or more marginal measures and an additional 2 for 
including a structural measure (so ±4 is the maximum for the intensity of any one reform package, 
±2 if it contains only marginal measures).  
c Number of (more or less flexibilising) reforms irrespective of intensity; the net value of a reform 
package containing countervailing measures determines classification as – or +. 
d The zero value signifies countervailing reforms, not the absence of reforms. 
Source: Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti social reforms database (URL: 
http://www.frdb.org/documentazione/centro_doc.php), accessed 4 April 2005. 
 
The main result is that member countries have become considerably more active in the 
second period (compare columns 5 and 6) as well as more inclined to reduce benefits for 
people out of work and increase incentives to work (compare columns 3 and 4). Reforms 
are often incremental, and they sometimes point in opposite directions, as simultaneous 
(+) and (–) measures in columns 5 and 6 indicate (France, Portugal and Spain in the 
 11
second period provide stark examples). Restructuring rather than retrenchment across the 
board seems to be the result (Rhodes and Ferrera 2000). The results in columns 1 and 2 
are compatible with the findings of the IMF (2004a) study according to which 
governments are less keen on reforms of employment protection – in fact some have 
increased rather than decreased EPL. 
  
In sum: there has been a clear change in the thrust of admittedly gradual reforms that 
broadly corresponds to the thrust of the Lisbon Agenda, namely to improve work 
incentives as determined by the tax-benefit system.  
 
How is the size of automatic stabilisers likely to be affected? 
We outlined above how Lisbon reforms may affect stabilisation. For our evaluation of the 
impact of the reduction of benefits or of average and marginal tax rates, we use 
EUROMOD, a tax-benefit simulation model based on micro-data for individual 
households in each of the EU-15 member states (Immervoll et al, 1999). It allows us to 
make comparable calculations of the effects that changes in policy parameters, such as 
taxes or benefits, have on household income. One limitation of EUROMOD is that the 
model does not allow for behavioural responses in consumption or labour supply to feed 
back onto household income and employment. However, this means that we can focus on 
the direct implications of the Lisbon reforms, without having to disentangle effects 
induced by the assumptions of a behavioural model (Atkinson 2002, pp.8-9; Sutherland 
2005). 
 
Our empirical assessment seeks to establish how much the size of automatic stabilisers 
would be affected by reforms which change responsiveness, measured as the (marginal) 
income elasticity of the affected automatic stabiliser, and weight, which is its share in 
disposable household income. As Box 1 shows, the coefficient of cyclical stabilisation, σ, 
is the product of the responsiveness and weight of each of the taxes and benefits which 
affect household disposable income.13  
 
Box 1: Estimating the size of automatic stabilisers and their determinants 
The stabilisation coefficient relates household market income ym to disposable income yd: 
By treating transfer payments to households (benefits) as negative taxation, we get: 
 
(1) yd = (1-σ)ym 
 
(2) σ = σ(tp, ts, b; ym)  
 
The stabilisation coefficient σ is a function personal income taxes (tp) and social 
insurance contributions (SICs) (ts) on the revenue side, and benefits (b) on the 
expenditure side. These taxes and transfers determine the relationship between gross and 
disposable household income. There is no reason to expect σ  to be constant, and for the 
analysis of cyclical stabilisation, we would ideally estimate σ for changes in income 
around its trend or equilibrium value. However, a simulation model like EUROMOD 
                                                 
13 The following is based on Mabbett (2004). We are grateful to the EUROMOD research team (Immervoll 
et al 2004), in particular Holly Sutherland, for giving us permission to use these results here. 
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examines changes in income, benefits and taxation relative to the model baseline (in this 
case, 1998), rather than relative to equilibrium income.14 The model allows us to simulate 
a rise or fall in income and thereby measure the coefficient of cyclical stabilisation as  
(3) m
d
y
y1 Δ
Δ−=σ  
where Δ signifies ‘arithmetic change’ in the respective variable.  
 
An equivalent method for estimating σ is to identify the elasticity of taxes, SICs and 
benefits with respect to a change in market income, and derive σ as the sum of the 
elasticity times the share in ym of each component: 
 
(4)  σ = βp·sp + βs·ss – βb·sb 
 
where βi represents the income elasticity of each component and si represents the share in 
ym of each component. It can easily be shown that equations (3) and (4) are equivalent 
formulations of the stabilisation coefficient (with tp for income tax, ts for employee SIC 
and b for benefits): 
 
(3a) m
sp
m
dm
y
btt
y
yy
Δ
Δ−Δ+Δ=Δ
Δ−Δ=σ  
 
(4a) 
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⎞
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⎛ ⋅Δ
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Table 2 presents estimates of the stabilisation coefficient σ generated by simulating a 
10% increase in earnings. The model calculates for each household the effect of higher 
earnings on taxes, SICs and benefit entitlement. The simulation does not include any 
status changes for household members (e.g. from unemployment to employment) so the 
effect on benefits is slight since only benefits which are related to earnings, such as 
working tax credits or social assistance, are affected.  
 
Table 2: Estimates of responsiveness, weight and income stabilisation in EU-14 
 Responsivenessa of automatic 
stabilisers (βi)  
Weightb of automatic 
stabiliser (si) 
Stab. co-
efficient 
 Income tax 
(βp) 
Employee 
SICc (βs) 
Benefits (βb) Income tax 
and SICc 
Benefits σ 
AT 16.4 7.7 0.0 36 38 0.46
                                                 
14 The microdata in EUROMOD are adjusted to 1998 values, but countries were not all at the same point in 
their economic cycles when the data were collected in the 1990s, so the deviations are not from the same 
cyclical position. This might affect the results if there are significant non-linearities in aggregate tax and 
benefit responses to changes in income. 
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BE 13.7 8.5 -0.3 38 40 0.51
DK 11.4 8.1 -0.6 49 25 0.58
FI 11.3 8.3 -0.2 42 37 0.55
FR 9.1 8.1 -0.6 31 36 0.33
GE 17.5 7.5 -0.6 36 29 0.51
GR 14.7 5.3 0.0 28 24 0.32
IR 18.8 10.9 -0.5 21 19 0.39
IT 11.2 8.4 -0.3 31 30 0.41
NL 19.0 5.8 -0.4 35 21 0.46
PT 14.4 8.5 -0.4 25 22 0.33
SP 16.4 3.8 0.0 22 29 0.32
SW 10.7 4.7 -0.5 42 38 0.49
UK 12.0 9.0 -0.5 25 21 0.33
a  Percentage change from baseline value due to a 10% change in earnings (marginal income 
elasticity) 
b Percentage share in gross household income 
c Social Insurance Contributions 
Source: EUROMOD, own calculations based on Mabbett (2004) 
 
The first three columns tell us, to take the example of Austria (AT), that for a 10% 
increase in earnings, income taxes respond strongly in that they increase by 16.4%. By 
contrast, SICs rise a less than proportional 7.7%; and benefits decrease hardly at all.15 It 
can be seen that, for all countries except France16, income tax rises by more than 10% 
(elasticity of household income tax with respect to earnings is greater than 1), while the 
converse is true for SICs in all countries except Ireland. The values for the stabilisation 
coefficient in the last column range from 0.31 for Spain to 0.57 for Denmark. In other 
words, the tax and benefit system reduces the fluctuations of disposable income by one-
third to more than one-half. This is consistent with the estimates of coefficients of 0.25-
0.3 for the USA generated by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) using a similar 
methodology. We would expect European values to be higher, because European welfare 
states are larger.  
 
Since we argued that the net impact of Lisbon-type reforms will depend on which 
determinant is more dominant, it is of interest to disentangle whether responsiveness or 
weight contributes more to the stabilisation coefficients in our set of countries. As chart 1 
(disregarding benefits) illustrates, weight is the dominant determinant of the size of the 
stabilisers. Stabilisation coefficients are positively correlated with weight (the black dots 
follow a rising trend) while no such relationship is discernible for responsiveness (the 
square and triangle data points follow neither a rising nor declining trend). We can also 
                                                 
15 In principle, it is possible to simulate the change in (un)employment status related to a rise in earnings by 
using Okun’s Law (Mabbett, 2004, p.10, table 3). This would increase the size of stabilisers on the benefit 
side. 
16 The somewhat surprising result for France reflects a base effect. When earnings rise by 10%, market 
income rises by less than 10% because households have other sources of income. A proportional income 
tax would therefore also rise by less than 10%: in the case of France, by 8.7%. This result does not show up 
for other countries which have significant non-earned household market income because of higher 
progressivity in the tax system. For a full breakdown, see Mabbett (2004: Table 1). 
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see that Denmark and Finland, to the right of the graph (i.e. with high values for the 
stabilisation coefficient) have relatively unresponsive tax and SIC structures, yet their 
weight compensates this. Conversely, Ireland has the lowest weight of taxes and SICs in 
household income, but high responsiveness. Ireland’s stabilisation coefficient is high 
given the small size of its government, although it is still below the EU average of 0.45.  
 
Chart 1: Determinants of the size of automatic stabilisers 
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The immediate conclusion for tax reforms is, first, that income tax and SIC reforms are 
central to what is going to happen to automatic stabilisers, because it is unlikely that the 
responsiveness of benefits can be massively increased, given that entitlements typically 
do not depend on income alone. A second conclusion is that lowering average income 
taxes, to reduce the tax burden overall or by shifting to indirect taxes, is likely to have a 
more pronounced weakening impact on automatic stabilisers (by reducing weight) than 
flattening marginal tax rates (which diminishes responsiveness). These conclusions are 
borne out by the fact that there is no low-weight (small government) country with a 
stabilisation coefficient above the average. The reverse does not hold, however. There are 
fairly ‘weighty’ tax-benefit systems that do not achieve a corresponding stabilising effect 
(notably France and Italy). Therefore weight helps but does not guarantee effective 
stabilisation.  
 
Obviously, these simulations cannot but give a rough indication of what Lisbon-type 
reforms – making tax and benefit systems ‘more employment-friendly’ – would do to 
macroeconomic stabilisation, but they do suggest that Lisbon-type reforms could have the 
negative side-effect of weakening fiscal stabilisation.  
 
Is effective automatic stabilisation bad for adjustment? 
Our conclusion from the EUROMOD simulations must address a possible objection that 
Buti and van den Noord (2003) formulate most forcefully: is this weakening of 
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conventional demand stabilisation really a loss, once we take labour supply adjustments 
into account? Their answer is a resounding “No”. They claim that automatic stabilisers 
are not the solution but the problem in that they prevent adjustments to supply shocks, 
thus making for stability with high unemployment. Weakening them generates a double 
dividend of supply-side flexibility and more effective stabilisation through 
microeconomic adjustment. The converse argument is that, notwithstanding the possible 
effects of taxes and benefits on individual behaviour (micro-level effects), the stabilisers 
have a positive impact on macroeconomic conditions. 
 
The empirical data we used for our earlier analyses allows us to do a limited evaluation of 
this hypothesis. If it holds, tax-benefit systems that yield high stabilisation coefficients 
according to our EUROMOD simulations (table 2) should have both high levels of 
unemployment and high unemployment persistence (low volatility of unemployment). 
  
Chart 2a: The size of automatic stabilisers and unemployment levels 
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As regards levels of unemployment, we find not a positive but a (weak) negative 
correlation: tax-benefit systems with stronger stabilising qualities or more generous 
unemployment benefits, respectively, had lower average unemployment rates in the 
period 1997-2004.17  The results for persistence or volatility of unemployment in chart 2b 
also fail to show the relationship hypothesised by Buti and van den Noord (2003) which 
implies a negative correlation (the higher the stabilisation coefficient, the more persistent 
is unemployment). 
 
                                                 
17 The Pearson correlation coefficient is -0.28.  
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Chart 2b: Automatic stabilisers  and unemployment persistence 
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An important criticism of the economic impact of social security benefits is that they 
reduce flexibility by operating asymmetrically over the cycle, generating permanent 
responses (long-term unemployment, early retirement) to cyclical downturns. Our 
analysis suggests that demand stabilisation through automatic fiscal mechanisms does not 
increase unemployment and does not add to unemployment persistence. We have not 
been able to examine the cyclical responsiveness of transfer payments directly, but recent 
work by Mélitz (2005) suggests that transfer payments have a distinct counter-cyclical 
pattern in European countries, rather than exhibiting asymmetric persistence. This 
appears to work through a variety of channels: for example, pension payments may fall 
relative to GDP in upturns due to postponement of retirement. Such mechanisms would 
imply that automatic stabilisation through the benefit system may allow households to 
adjust labour supply to labour demand, enhancing rather than impairing flexibility.  
Conclusions  
 
Our exploratory study suggests that Lisbon-type reforms, such as lowering the average 
tax burden and reducing high effective marginal tax rates, are problematic from the point 
of view of fiscal stabilisation. This is because they would lower the weight and the 
responsiveness of member states’ tax systems to shocks and business cycle fluctuations. 
The potentially positive effects of reforms on the cyclical responsiveness of benefits are 
too small to compensate. Negative spillovers from structural reforms on the stabilising 
qualities of tax-benefit systems are particularly worrying for EMU members since they 
have little scope for discretionary fiscal policy. This finding is relevant for the political 
economy of reform and European integration. The dual agenda of the EU induces 
governments to ask their electorates not only to accept that not all past commitments as 
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regards old-age or unemployment benefits will be honoured but also that they will have 
to self-insure more volatile market incomes.  
 
Our findings on the size of stabilisers, as summarized in table 2 and chart 1, contain some 
lessons for the ongoing restructuring of welfare states. First of all, if governments are 
mindful not only of microeconomic flexibility but also macroeconomic stability, they 
may want to exploit the possibilities of raising the progressivity of taxes while lowering 
the overall tax burden. SICs are generally less progressive (responsive) than income 
taxes, so reform of social insurance contribution structures or substitution of taxes for 
SICs may improve the operation of the stabilisers. However, there is no continuous 
tradeoff between responsiveness and weight; progressivity cannot vary that much and has 
to be limited as government gets bigger. The empirical results reported here give little 
insight into the potential on the benefit side, but theory suggests that Lisbon-type benefit 
reforms may actually be constructive since their overall thrust is ‘activation’ which in the 
context of our study means replacing permanent transfers by temporary ones.  
 
Finally, we would like to stress that it is unlikely that fiscal stabilisation can be 
substituted by more flexible supply-side adjustment. Furthermore, we question the ‘back 
against the wall’ political economy which suggests that the absence of countercyclical 
macroeconomic policy will strengthen incentives to reform. On the contrary, we see 
adverse macroeconomic conditions as making welfare reforms more difficult, and our 
results suggest that such reforms may weaken fiscal stabilisation. This suggests that more 
attention should be paid to the compatibility of welfare state reforms and macroeconomic 
policy for which the recent decision to ‘streamline’ (link) fiscal policy coordination and 
the Lisbon process (CEC, 2005c) provides an opportunity.  
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